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ABSTRACT 
Our results highlight the importance of interaction among management, labor, and 
investors in shaping corporate governance. We find that strong union laws protect not 
only workers but also underperforming managers. Weak investor protection combined 
with strong union laws are conducive to worker-management alliances, wherein poorly 
performing firms sell assets to prevent large scale layoffs, garnering worker support to 
retain management. Asset sales in weak investor protection countries lead to further 
deteriorating performance, whereas in strong investor protection countries they improve 
performance and lead to more layoffs. Strong union laws are less effective in preventing 
layoffs when financial leverage is high.  
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Much of the research in law and finance focuses on the role of legal protection of 
investors in shaping corporate governance.
1
 However, investors are but one of many 
stakeholders. Other stakeholders who participate in governance include labor and 
management. Labor receives legal protection with substantial variation across countries, 
and its self interests often conflict with those of investors, at least in the short run. How 
do firms respond to these conflicting interests? The answer depends on stakeholders’ 
relative influence on the decision making process, which varies across countries due to 
political and social factors (Roe (2003)). When investors have greater influence, higher 
priority is given to enhancing capital value. When labor has greater influence, employee 
welfare may receive higher priority over value enhancement (Tirole (2001)).  
This paper investigates how the two stakeholders’ relative influence and firm-
level variables interact to affect restructuring decisions when firms suffer a sudden, sharp 
deterioration in operating performance. We proxy for stakeholders’ relative influence at 
the country level by the strength of legal protection of investors and labor, using 
measures compiled by Djankov et al. (2005), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006), and 
Botero et al. (2004). We examine firms at the onset of declining performance in order to 
avoid firms with prolonged poor performance that may already have undertaken 
restructuring measures. Our focus on poorly performing firms is motivated by the 
possibility that conflicts among stakeholders become more acute when the size of the 
economic pie shrinks. However, it is not obvious how such conflicts affect the nature and 
the likelihood of restructuring. On the one hand, conflicts may lead to further 
deterioration of the firm; on the other hand, the stakeholders may rally around the crisis 
to improve the firm’s chance of survival.  
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We consider three types of restructuring measures: large scale employee layoffs, 
top management turnover, and major asset sales. Previous studies suggest that each of 
these improves stock price and subsequent operating performance.
2
 However, part or all 
of the shareholder gains may arise at the expense of other stakeholders (Shleifer and 
Summers (1988)). The sacrificing stakeholders may therefore seek to block these 
restructuring measures. For example, workers may object to investors’ attempt to replace 
underperforming management if they fear a new management team would slash jobs, 
wages, and benefits. If labor laws grant sufficient power to workers to block such actions, 
the incumbent management may form an alliance with workers to maintain the status quo 
by foregoing value-enhancing restructuring measures resisted by workers. 
We argue such an alliance is plausible in countries with strong union power and 
weak investor protection and discuss the economic links between the competing 
incentives of management, labor, and investors. The theoretical discussion leads to 
testable hypotheses about how the nature and the likelihood of restructuring decisions are 
affected by the relative legal strength of labor vis-à-vis investors. We test the hypotheses 
on a sample of 9,923 firms (10,947 firm-years) at the onset of sharply declining operating 
performance in 41 developed and emerging economies over the period 1993 to 2004.  
We find that poorly performing firms in stronger investor protection countries are 
more likely to undertake large-scale worker layoffs and replace top management than 
those in weaker investor protection countries. These restructuring actions are followed by 
superior operating performance in all legal environments. Major asset sales are different, 
however. We observe more asset sales when investor protection is either very strong or 
very weak. Asset sales in strong investor protection countries are followed by superior 
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operating performance, whereas asset sales in weak investor protection countries are 
followed by inferior subsequent operating performance.
3
  
The likelihood of value-reducing asset sales increases as collective bargaining and 
labor relations laws grant more power to labor unions, suggesting that these asset sales 
are countenanced by workers. In addition, underperforming top managers in low investor 
protection countries are more likely to retain their jobs as union power increases. These 
results point toward management-worker alliances motivated by a mutual desire to retain 
jobs. For such an alliance to work, management needs funds to minimize layoffs and 
wage cuts. Lacking other means to raise the necessary funds, poorly performing firms sell 
assets to forestall layoffs even when doing so hurts subsequent operating performance. 
Indeed, asset sales in weak investor protection countries do not lead to layoffs, whereas in 
strong investor protection countries asset sales predict layoffs. 
Other interpretations of our results include: (1) asset markets are undeveloped in 
weak investor protection countries; (2) assets are sold at fire sales to pay off creditors; 
and (3) poorly performing managers blame strong unions to avoid accountability. 
Although these stories partially explain our results, none is fully consistent with the data.  
We also show that our results concerning layoffs and asset sales are not explained by 
differences in conditions existing prior to performance declines.  
Another important facet of labor laws relates to employment contract laws. Rigid 
employment laws make it difficult for a firm to adjust labor costs. When a firm bears a 
negative revenue shock, the firm’s inability to make adequate adjustments to its labor 
costs exacerbates the decline in the value of its assets. Firms operating with this imposed 
inflexibility may sell their most affected divisions and assets to other firms that can either 
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circumvent the labor regulation or find higher valued uses through synergies. Consistent 
with this conjecture, we observe more major asset sales when employment laws are more 
protective.  
Firm-level variables also matter in restructuring decisions. Firms with higher 
leverage are more likely to undertake all three types of restructuring. This disciplining 
role of leverage shows more bite when investor protection is stronger. More interesting, 
strong union laws are less effective in preventing large-scale layoffs when firms have 
higher financial leverage. Ownership concentration also is positively related to all three 
types of restructuring. For management turnover, the positive relation is significant only 
when top managers are not major shareholders: a major shareholder-manager is not likely 
to dismiss herself for poor performance. Asset sales exhibit a similar pattern: major 
shareholder-managers are less likely to sell assets, perhaps because they are reluctant to 
reduce private benefits associated with a larger asset base.  
In Section I we discuss relevant theoretical issues and develop the hypotheses. 
Section II describes the empirical design, sample construction, and data. Section III 
presents empirical results and robustness checks. We make concluding remarks in 
Section IV. 
I. Legal Environment and Restructuring Decisions: Development of Hypotheses  
 To analyze the economic links between the competing incentives of workers, 
investors, and management of poorly performing firms, we assume that (1) shareholders 
and creditors share a common objective to preserve and enhance capital value,
4
 (2) top 
management and workers want to retain their jobs, and (3) top managers are 
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opportunistic, weighing the relative influence of investors and workers and siding with 
the group that can best help them retain their own jobs. 
When firms suffer from poor operating performance, shareholders may pressure 
management to undertake restructuring actions to improve firm performance. Creditors 
also may demand corrective measures, especially when debt covenants are violated 
(Roberts and Sufi (2006)). Whether these demands will be executed depends on the 
firm’s governance. If the firm is investor friendly, it is likely to undertake value-
enhancing measures; if it is worker friendly, the firm may refrain from actions deemed 
detrimental to employee welfare.  
Whether governance favors investors or workers is determined by both firm- and 
country-specific factors (Durnev and Kim (2005)). We first consider country factors, as 
proxied by investor and labor protection laws. We hypothesize that layoffs are more 
likely with stronger investor protection and weaker union laws. Large-scale worker 
layoffs tend to lead to direct conflicts between investors and workers. Opportunistic top 
managers facing potential dismissal for poor performance will weigh the relative 
influence of investors and workers and side with those with greater influence.  
How the legal environment affects management turnover is less straightforward. 
Although the literature has focused on investors’ abilities to remove underperforming 
managers, workers also can influence the outcome. Replacing top management is an 
attempt by investors or workers to change the direction of the firm by bringing in new 
leadership. If a change is necessary for value enhancement, stronger investor rights 
should increase the likelihood of top management turnover. Workers will not oppose 
changes if the new management is expected to get the firm out of trouble without 
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employee sacrifice. However, poor performance may be due partly to managers’ 
tendencies to overpay workers (Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999)) and their reluctance to 
trim an unproductive workforce, because of their desire for the quiet life (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003)). Workers will be protective of such labor friendly management 
because new managers brought in to improve performance may force layoffs and reduce 
wages.  
Managers may even collude with workers for mutual protection. Pagano and 
Volpin (2005) develop a model in which managers collude with workers by bribing them 
with above market wages to thwart hostile takeover attempts. This collusion hypothesis is 
supported by evidence provided in Rauh (2006) and Kim and Ouimet (2008).
5
 Similar 
collusion is possible when firms suffer poor performance. Facing potential dismissal for 
poor performance, top managers may form an alliance with labor by abstaining from 
worker layoffs and wage cuts. Workers, in turn, may help retain such managers if they 
have sufficient power to affect the decision.  
Workers influence management retention through several channels. Botero et al. 
(2004) state “workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Board of 
Directors” (page 1349) in Austria, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, 
Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden. Such board representation gives labor a direct means to 
influence managerial compensation and retention. For example, German firms with more 
than 2,000 employees are required to have 50% worker representation on their 
supervisory boards responsible for selecting chief executives and reviewing their 
performance.
6
 In fact, Botero et al. include the right to board representation as a measure 
of the strength of union power in their labor law index.  
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Workers also indirectly influence top management retention. They may attempt to 
retain labor-friendly management by opposing liquidation in favor of reorganization with 
current management intact, or they may lobby for government bailouts to curtail the 
urgency for layoffs and management turnover. To achieve these goals, workers may 
organize strikes against mergers or other methods designed to introduce new 
management. These direct and indirect worker influences should be more effective when 
workers are empowered through strong union laws.  
An alliance between top management and workers may not result from explicit 
collusion. Managers simply may feel reluctant to cut wages or fire workers with whom 
they have developed working relationships. This reluctance would be reinforced when 
unions have the legal means to prevent investor attempts to oust incumbent management. 
These implicit alliances are expected to be more effective in preventing management 
turnover in countries with stronger labor union power and weaker investor protection.  
The recent Volkswagen scandal in Germany, a country with strong union laws,
7
 
illustrates such a management-labor alliance. Volkswagen’s top management was under 
pressure from investors for the firm’s poor operating performance: its EBITDA to total 
assets ratio was the lowest among the four major automakers in Germany over the 2002 
to 2005 period, and it was thirteenth out of 17 major automakers worldwide over the 
2003 to 2005 period.
8
 In 2005, German state prosecutors accused the top managers of 
bribery for paying labor representatives on its supervisory board as much as $36,000 per 
individual for pleasure trips to Brazil in return for their support. According to a July18, 
2005 Business Week article, “CEOs and top managers depend on votes from the labor 
reps to be reappointed. Instead of making tough decisions on restructuring or job cuts, 
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German managers are inclined to delay or avoid change and instead curry favor with 
union bosses sitting on their boards, often to the detriment of their companies.”  
The third type of restructuring, asset sales, is generally considered to enhance 
value. If a firm sells assets to redeploy underutilized resources to higher-valued uses, 
asset sales should increase shareholder value. Workers, on the other hand, will resist asset 
sales if they lead to layoffs or diminish the value of their future claims, such as 
underfunded health-care and pension liabilities.  
Workers may not resist asset sales, however, if the sales are part of a delaying 
tactic to maintain the status quo through a management-worker alliance. To avoid wage 
cuts and worker layoffs, management may have to sell assets. Because poorly performing 
firms are typically cash constrained, selling underperforming assets may not be sufficient. 
They may have to resort to selling assets even if doing so destroys synergies with the 
remaining assets, thereby reducing value. Even when assets are sold at the fair market 
value without affecting synergies, using the proceeds to delay necessary cuts in payroll 
will reduce value. Value-reducing asset sales will be blocked by investors if they have the 
ability to do so.  
Since a management-worker alliance require strong union power, the likelihood 
of value-reducing asset sales is greater in countries with weaker investor protection and 
stronger union laws. Conversely, value-enhancing asset sales are more likely in countries 
with stronger investor protection and weaker union laws. 
Value-reducing asset sales represent a governance failure. They exacerbate poor 
operating performance, eventually hurting most stakeholders in the long run, including 
workers. There are two possible reasons for such a governance failure. First, if a great 
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deal of uncertainty surrounds exogenous variables affecting operating performance, 
managers and workers may rationally decide on costly delaying actions that would allow 
them to wait for an outcome, albeit with a low probability, that will more than make up 
for the value lost due to asset sales. This is analogous to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
asset substitution hypothesis in which shareholders may choose a higher risk, lower NPV 
project. Delays may also provide managers and workers time to locate alternative jobs. 
The second reason for a governance failure is a behavioral bias based on the 
theory that people delay immediate-cost activities and engages in immediate-reward 
activities too soon (O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (1999)). That is, management delays 
restructuring decisions with immediate cost to workers and managers even though doing 
so may lead to an even worse outcome. One way to avoid such a governance failure is for 
management and workers to bond themselves to actions expected in strong investor 
protection and weak union law countries. However, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) 
argue, with supporting evidence, that such mechanisms are either unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive in countries with poor investor protection. 
To summarize the main hypotheses, we list the likelihood of each restructuring 
measure for different combinations of investor protection and labor union laws: 
 













Strong Weak High High High Low 
Weak Strong Low Low Low High 
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Note that these predictions apply only to union laws. Employment contract laws 
are another important component of labor laws that may affect restructuring decisions. 
Botero et al. (2004) construct an index measuring the rigidity of employment laws, which 
includes the costs of hiring and firing workers, reducing wages, and changing working 
hours. We hypothesize that inflexible employment laws encourage asset sales during 
corporate distress. Consider a firm suffering a sharp drop in revenue. If inflexible laws 
prevent the firm from making the necessary cut in labor costs, the value of its assets 
utilizing the workforce will decline. The firm may be able to realize higher values by 
selling the affected assets to other firms that can find a means to circumvent the 
regulation or redeploy the assets to higher-valued uses.  
II. Empirical Design, Sample Construction, and Data 
A. Empirical Design  
We estimate country random effects logit regression models. The dependent 
variable is equal to one if there are large-scale layoffs, management turnover, or major 
asset sales. The independent variables are investor protection, labor laws, financial 
leverage, and ownership concentration. Control variables are firm size and the previous 
year’s operating performance. We include leverage because Ofek (1993) and Kang and 
Shivdasani (1997) find that leverage increases investors’ ability to force large-scale 
layoffs and management turnover. Ownership concentration is included because it helps 
shareholders internalize the benefits of taking action. We expect ownership concentration 
to be positively related to value-enhancing restructuring actions. 
We also account for the interactions between leverage and investor protection, 
and leverage and labor laws. The disciplining role of leverage should depend on the legal 
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protection of creditors and shareholders because strong creditor rights make the threat of 
bankruptcy more credible, while strong shareholder rights make it more likely for firms 
to take advantage of the threat of bankruptcy. Thus, we expect the leverage effect to be 
stronger as investor protection increases. 
Leverage also has a role in strengthening shareholders’ bargaining position vis-à-
vis labor. Bronars and Deere (1991) show that financial leverage reduces the power of 
labor unions because the increased threat of bankruptcy due to leverage makes it easier to 
extract concessions from unions. Thus, we hypothesize that the ability of union laws to 
deter layoffs and asset sales becomes weaker with higher financial leverage.  
Labor laws consist of two components: union laws and employee contract laws. 
They have a correlation coefficient of 0.3264. Correlations among investor protection, the 
interaction terms, and the labor variables are all high. When we include some of these 
variables in a regression with both union laws and employee contract laws, the variance 
inflation factor is well above three, indicating a severe multicollinearity problem. In order 
to properly identify the coefficients on the labor variables, regressions are estimated 
separately for each. 
 For all specifications we perform the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test. The test 
statistics suggest the presence of unobserved country-level heterogeneity. Thus, when 
regressions contain country-level explanatory variables, we use country random effects; 
otherwise, we use country fixed effects. We also use year fixed effects to control for 
possible macroeconomic factors (e.g., financial crises and recessions) and industry fixed 
effects at the two-digit SIC level to control for industry-wide factors affecting 
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restructuring decisions.
9
 Following Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004), we correct the 
coefficients on the interaction terms for the nonlinearity of the logit specification.  
B. Sample Construction  
The primary source of our firm-level data is Worldscope. We identify 25,698 
industrial companies with sufficient data to conduct our tests from 41 countries over the 
period 1993 to 2004.
10
 From these firms we look for initially healthy firms that suffered a 
sharp drop in operating performance, measured by EBITDA/TA. Table I contains the 
descriptions of all variables used in the paper. We use an accounting-based measure of 
operating performance instead of a stock price-based measure, because stock markets are 
forward looking and market values reflect the likelihood to undertake restructuring 
measures. For example, a more shareholder-friendly company may experience a smaller 
drop in valuation for the same decline in operating performance because of higher 
anticipation of value-enhancing restructuring.  
For layoffs and asset sales, our definition of poorly performing firms follows 
Kang and Shivdasani (1997). We require that the company initially have a positive, 
above-industry median EBITDA/TA in the base year and experience a drop of more than 
50% in EBITDA in the following year. This selection procedure yields 8,493 companies 
(10,904 firm-years).  
To identify poorly performing top management, we use a different criterion based 
on a relative performance measure. Consider the airline industry, which suffered a big 
drop in EBITDA after 9/11. When all airlines suffer losses, the performance of an 
airline’s CEO should be judged relative to that of her rivals, not by an absolute measure. 
Thus, we follow Denis and Kruse (2000) and classify top management as 
Table I 
about here 
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underperforming if a company’s EBITDA/TA is initially above the industry median and 
falls to the bottom quartile of its industry in the following year.
11
 This yields 6,988 firms 
(7,358 firm-years) with underperforming management. As a robustness check, we repeat 
the analyses using a sample based on the absolute measure of a 50% drop in EBITDA for 
management turnover. The conclusions do not change.  
Table II presents the total number of firm-years with available data for each of the 
41 countries and the number of poorly performing firm-years with at least a 50% drop in 
EBITDA. The proportion of distressed firms is fairly evenly distributed across countries 
with a mean of 11%. Two-thirds of the distressed firms are observed between 2000 and 
2004 because the number of firms and countries covered by Worldscope increase 
dramatically after 2000. 
Direct comparison of the accounting-based data across countries is problematic 
because of different accounting standards. However, a key distinguishing characteristic in 
legal environments across countries is accounting standards; thus, to some extent, our 
country-level measures of investor and labor protection control for such differences. 
Additionally, within-country industry indicator variables help control for different 
accounting practices across industries. Any remaining noise would weaken the power of 
our tests. Nevertheless, we conduct a robustness check by using different cutoff points to 
construct the sample (i.e., a 30% and 40% drop instead of the 50% drop in EBITDA/TA). 
The main results are robust to different cutoff points.  
C. Measures of Corporate Restructuring
12
  
Our measures of top management turnover, large-scale employee layoffs, and 
major asset sales are not as refined as those used in single-country studies. Our study 
Table II 
about here 
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covers 41 countries and news searches for information in non-English speaking countries 
would require knowledge of local languages.
13
 Thus, we construct management turnover 
from data on top executive names provided by Worldscope. This variable takes the value 
of one for year t if the top two executives in year t-1 do not appear as executives in year t 
or year t+1, where year t is the distress year. We use the removal of the top two officers 
rather than only the top officer for two reasons. First, the turnover is more likely to be 
forced rather than voluntary if the two top executives leave the company. Second, 
Worldscope provides only officer titles, which are not uniform across countries. Because 
it is sometimes difficult to identify the top officer by title alone, we take this more 
conservative approach. For a robustness check, we require that all three top executives in 
year t-1 do not appear as executives in year t or year t+1. The results are similar. We 
include year t+1 because replacing top management may take time. 
The variable Layoffs takes the value of one if a company experiences more than a 
20% drop in the number of employees from year t-1 to year t or t+1. The variable Asset 
sales takes a value of one if a company experiences more than a 15% drop in its NPPE 
from year t-1 to year t or t+1. Although these cutoff points are somewhat arbitrary, they 
are based on previous findings.
14
 For robustness we use different cutoff levels for Layoffs 
(15% or 25% decline in the number of employees) and Asset sales (10% or 20% 
reduction in NPPE) and find similar results. Because NPPE is measured in local 
currency, the changes are not affected by exchange rate changes.  
There may be other sources of noise in Layoffs. Hallock (1998) observes that the 
Compustat database does not record the changes in employment numbers as frequently as 
changes in financial variables, because personnel information is subject to looser 
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reporting and auditing requirements than financial variables. If data for other countries 
have similar problems, our Layoffs may underestimate the true extent of employee 
reduction. This problem is somewhat mitigated by our inclusion of year t+1 in defining 
Layoffs. Any remaining underestimation weakens the power of our tests.  
It is also possible that accounting write-offs may lead to an overestimate of Asset 
sales. Our use of changes in NPPE to measure asset sales mitigates this problem because 
inventories and account receivables, which are often subject to write-offs, are excluded 
from the definition of NPPE. Write-offs due to a plant closure or to scrapping equipment 
also reduce NPPE; however, these actions are precisely what we want to capture as asset 
restructuring.  
D. Legal Variables 
Our measure of investor protection considers both the de jure and de facto aspects 
of regulation. We define the variable Shareholder to be equal to the sum of normalized 
values of the revised Anti-director index and the Anti-self-dealing index in Djankov et al. 
(2005). Both indices measure minority shareholder protection against controlling 
shareholders’ actions that would hurt shareholder value. We use the Djankov, McLiesh, 
and Shleifer (2006) creditor index, Creditor, for legal protection of creditor rights. This 
index is updated yearly. For these and all other legal variables, a higher number indicates 
stronger protection. These legal indices measure formal rules but enforcement of these 
rules varies across countries. The proxy for de facto regulation is based on the Law and 
Order variable, which is updated monthly. We take yearly averages of this index. Both 
Creditor and Law and Order are lagged by one year from the distress year.  
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These four legal variables are normalized on a scale of zero to one and are 
reported in Table II for each country.
15
 Most of these variables are highly positively 
correlated with each other. To mitigate potential multicollinearity problems arising from 
these correlations and to combine their different attributes, we take the sum of their 
normalized values to create a single measure of investor protection, Financier, which also 
is reported in Table II. For a robustness check, we use only the revised Anti-director 
index or only the Anti-self-dealing index with Creditor and Law and Order to measure 
Financier. We also use the product of the four variables instead of their sum. The results 
are robust.  
The data for labor regulations come from Botero et al. (2004), who classify labor 
laws into three major country-level indices. The first index, Emp_Cont, measures the 
rigidity of employment contracts laws. The second index, Union, assesses the legal 
protection of labor unions and the regulation of collective disputes. Strong collective 
relations laws strengthen union power. The third index, Soc_Sec, measures the strength of 
social security laws.
16
 Botero et al. (2004) show that social security laws are closely 
related to GDP per capita and reflect a country’s level of economic development.
17
 
These labor law indices and their correlations with other legal variables are 
reported in Table II and Panel A of Table III, respectively. All labor indices are positively 
correlated with each other and are negatively correlated with almost all components of 
investor protection.  
E. Firm-level Variables 
 Data for firm-level variables also come from Worldscope. We use the logarithm 
of sales to measure the size of the firm. Larger firms are more likely to be unionized, may 
Table III, Panel A 
and Panel B 
about here 
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be slower in reacting to external shocks, and have a better chance to be bailed out by the 
government during distress, all of which may affect restructuring decisions. Large firms 
also receive more public attention and are more likely to be covered by Worldscope. It 
also may be easier for smaller firms to lay off 20% of employees and sell 15% of assets.  
Ownership data come from Worldscope, Amadeus, the ISI Emerging Markets 
Database, local stock exchanges, and company websites. We proxy for ownership 
concentration by the variable Own, the sum of the equity stakes of the three largest 
shareholders, each with more than 5% of the firm shares. None of the firms in our sample 
lists the government as a direct owner with more than 5% ownership. The ownership data 
for top executives is available only for 2002 to 2004. We average the three years and use 
it as a proxy for the actual managerial ownership for the rest of the period.
18
 All firm-
level variables are winsorized at the 1% level. 
Table III, Panel B provides summary statistics for the sample firms with a drop 
greater than 50% in EBITDA. It reports the mean and median of firm-level variables for 
the base and distress years, which show that all measures concerning size, profitability, 
number of employees, and dollar amount of outstanding debt drop significantly from the 
base year to the distress year.
19
 The variables Layoffs, Asset sales, and Management 
turnover all increase significantly from the base year to the distress year. Asset sales and 
layoffs are significantly correlated with each other: of 1,988 major asset sales, 659 
involve layoffs of more than 20% of employees. In contrast, management turnover is 
uncorrelated with either asset sales or layoffs.  
III. Empirical Results 
A. Univariate Analysis 
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To see how corporate restructuring decisions vary across legal environments, we 
divide the countries into quartiles in terms of legal protection of investors and labor. 
Table IV compares the average proportion of poorly performing firms undertaking 
layoffs, asset sales, and management turnover between the top and bottom quartiles. It 
reveals several noteworthy patterns.  
 First, large-scale layoffs and major asset sales are more frequent in countries with 
more rigid employment laws. Workers appear to fare worse  during corporate distress 
under highly protective employment laws.  
 Second, when union laws are strong, we observe significantly fewer employee 
layoffs and management turnovers, indicating that strong union laws increase job security 
not only for employees but also for underperforming managers. Strong union laws are 
also associated with more asset sales, implying that asset sales are sanctioned by unions. 
 Third, strong investor protection is associated with more employee layoffs and 
increased management turnover, consistent with the notion that layoffs and management 
turnover are, in general, value enhancing. However, we observe significantly fewer asset 
sales in strong investor protection countries. This counters the widely held view that asset 
sales enhance value because we should observe more, not less, value-enhancing decisions 
when investors enjoy strong legal protection.  
 We check whether this result on asset sales is related to our treatment of 
shareholders and creditors as one. Although shareholders and creditors share a common 
objective to enhance/preserve capital value, they may differ on the timing of asset sales 
because shareholders have convex claims on the cash flows whereas creditors have 
concave claims. Thus, we separate Financier into Shareholder and Creditor. We then 
Table IV 
about here 
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examine the frequency of asset sales for different configurations of bottom and top 
quartiles by shareholder and creditor protection. That is, we conduct a 2 x 2 analysis, 
where the rows represent the top and bottom quartiles of Creditor and the columns 
represent the top and bottom quartiles of Shareholder. We find no difference between 
firms in the top creditor and bottom shareholder protection quartiles and firms in the top 
shareholder and bottom creditor quartiles. Also, the firms in the top quartiles for both 
creditor and shareholder protection show significantly fewer asset sales than those in the 
bottom quartiles for both creditor and shareholder protection. In sum, the results on asset 
sales are insensitive to separate treatment of shareholder and creditor protection. 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
 In this section, we investigate how the likelihood of each restructuring measure is 
related to the legal protection of investors and workers, leverage, and ownership 
concentration. We first report results concerning employee layoffs and management 
turnover, followed by asset sales. We also investigate how investor protection and union 
laws interact in affecting restructuring decisions.   
B.1. Employee Layoffs and Management Turnover 
 Table V reports the results of country random effect logit regressions in which the 
dependent variable is equal to one if there are large-scale layoffs (Panel A) or if there is 
management turnover (Panel B). The effects of legal variables are largely consistent with 
the univariate results. Stronger investor protection is associated with a higher likelihood 
of layoffs and management turnover, demonstrating investors’ greater ability to force 
poorly performing firms to cut labor costs and bring in new leadership. According to our 
estimates, a firm in the lowest quartile of investor protection has a 5.31% (7.21%) 
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likelihood of employee layoffs (management turnover), while an otherwise similar firm 
in the top quartile has a 9.83% (9.50%) likelihood.  Also as expected, the strength of 
collective relations laws (Union) is associated with a lower likelihood of employee 
layoffs. A firm in a bottom-quartile country in Union has a 10.25% likelihood of large-
scale employee layoffs, while an otherwise similar firm in the top quartile has a 5.04% 
likelihood.  
 The interaction between Union and leverage is significantly positive for Layoffs, 
revealing that the deterrent effect of strong union laws on layoffs is curtailed by high 
leverage. Apparently, the increased threat of bankruptcy stemming from high leverage 
increases shareholders’ bargaining position vis-à-vis labor, weakening union laws’ ability 
to reduce layoffs.  
 Panel B shows that union laws also protect management. A firm in a top-quartile 
country in Union has a 9.67% likelihood of management turnover, while an otherwise 
similar firm in the bottom quartile has a 7.62% likelihood of turnover. When estimated 
separately for low investor protection countries (in Table X), where a management-
worker alliance is more likely, the difference becomes much larger.  
 The results on the firm-specific variables indicate that both leverage and poor 
performance increase the likelihood of layoffs. Moreover, the interaction between 
Leverage and Financier is positive and significant for three of the four specifications. 
The disciplining role of leverage seems to have more bite with stronger investor 
protection.  
 Ownership concentration is positively and significantly related to layoffs, 







     23
during corporate distress. However, its coefficient on management turnover is mostly  
insignificant. We suspect the insignificance is due to some top managers also being large 
shareholders.
20
 Thus, we add a manager/owner indicator variable, Mgmt/Own, to the 
regressions in Table VI, which reports estimates for all three restructuring measures. 
Columns 3 and 4 indicate that management turnover is less likely when top officers are 
also major stockholders. The coefficient on Own becomes significant with Union, which 
controls for the negative correlation between Union and management turnover. Higher 
ownership concentration helps remove underperforming top managers only when they are 
not major shareholders.  
 The last two columns in Table VI show that the management ownership indicator 
also has a significant negative effect on asset sales. Major shareholder-managers seem to 
be less inclined to sell assets, perhaps because their private benefits of control decrease 
with fewer assets under their control. 
B.2. Asset Sales 
 The last two columns of Table VI also confirm the univariate finding that there 
are more asset sales in weaker investor protection countries. We entertain three possible 
explanations. First, assets are sold to finance the current payroll to appease workers in a 
management-worker alliance. Second, what appear to be asset sales is a diversion of 
corporate resources by management or controlling shareholders for their own private 
benefits. These types of asset grabbing (tunneling) are more likely in weak investor 
protection countries (Johnson et al. (2000), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), and Durnev and Kim (2005)).  
Table VI 
about here 
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Third, firms in poor investor protection countries may be smaller and therefore 
more likely to sell assets during performance declines. This is unlikely because we 
control for firm size in the regression. The data also tell a different story: our sample 
firms in poor investor protection countries are larger than those in strong protection 
countries, whether firm size is measured by total assets, sales, or the number of 
employees.
21
 Although this may be due to the way Worldscope selects companies from 
different countries, size cannot explain the negative relation between asset sales and 
investor protection.  
 Thus, we investigate the first two possibilities by examining post-asset sales 
performance. Table VII, Panel A compares the change in performance of firms with asset 
sales to those without asset sales, for countries in the top and bottom quartile in investor 
protection. The change in performance is measured by subtracting the distress year’s 
performance from the average performance in the two-year period following the year of 
distress. The table shows the change in performance of the median firm, where 
performance is measured by EBITDA/TA (rows 1-3) and Sales/TA (rows 4-6), with rows 
3 and 6 showing the difference in performance between the median firm with and the 
median firm without asset sales. We report the median firm because of high skewness. 
Comparing the mean firms leads to the same conclusions.  
 The results are striking. In terms of operating profit (EBITDA/TA), the median 
firm with asset sales (ASales = 1) in the top financier quartile countries shows significant 
improvement in its post-distress performance, and the improvement is significantly 
greater than that for the median firm without asset sales (ASales = 0). For the median 
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asset sales shows further deterioration in performance, whereas the median firm without 
asset sales shows significant improvement in post-distress performance. Comparing asset 
turnover (Sales/TA) yields similar patterns. Selling assets improves asset utilization 
(relative to firms without asset sales) in the top investor protection countries, and worsens 
asset utilization in the bottom investor protection countries. 
 Finally, these differences in subsequent performance seem to be related to the 
frequency of firms’ disappearance from the sample. The last three rows show that in the 
bottom-quartile countries, significantly more firms with asset sales disappear from the 
sample than firms without asset sales. In the top quartile countries, there is no difference 
between firms with and without asset sales. The last column also shows that among the 
firms with asset sales, a significantly larger fraction of firms in the bottom quartile 
disappear from the sample than those in the top-quartile countries. These disappearances 
from the sample could be due to bankruptcy or mergers, although it is possible that 
Worldscope discontinues their coverage for other reasons.  
 To check whether these results on asset sales are robust to controlling for other 
firm characteristics, we relate post-distress performance in terms of EBITDA/TA and 
Sales/TA to Asset sales, while controlling for firm size, leverage, ownership 
concentration, and performance during the distress year. The regressions are estimated 
separately for high and low investor protection countries (divided by the median). Unlike 
the other regressions, we use country fixed effects because none of the explanatory 
variables is measured at the country level.  
 Panel B of Table VII reports results with Asset sales, Layoffs, or Turnover as the 
key independent variable.  The results on Asset sales are consistent with those in Panel 
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A.
22
 Its coefficient is significantly negative for weak investor protection countries, 
whether the dependent variable is operating profit or asset turnover, confirming that these 
asset sales hurt a firm’s subsequent operating performance. By contrast, the coefficient is 
significantly positive for strong investor protection countries for both dependent 
variables, implying that these asset sales improve subsequent operating performance.
23
  
 The results also show positive coefficients on Layoffs and Management turnover 
in both strong and weak investor protection countries. Unlike asset sales, the 
performance-improving effects of layoffs and management turnover do not depend on 
investor protection.
24
   
Because of the distinctly different effects of asset sales between strong and weak 
investor protection countries, we estimate the likelihood of asset sales separately for 
countries with above- and below-median investor protection. The results are reported in 
Table VIII. They show that the relation between investor protection and the likelihood of 
asset sales differs sharply between the two sets of countries. The relation is significantly 
positive in strong investor protection countries and significantly negative in weak 
investor protection countries. There are more asset sales when investor protection is 
either very strong or very weak. 
The table also shows that employment contract laws are significantly positively 
related to asset sales for both sets of countries, illustrating that inflexible employment 
laws encourage asset sales during distress. Our result parallels that of Besley and Burgess 
(2004), who find that Indian states with stronger labor regulations attract less investment. 
In our case the discouraging effect of employment laws on investment takes the form of 
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 The interaction term between leverage and Financier switches signs depending on 
whether investor protection is high or low. In high investor protection countries, leverage 
improves investors’ ability to force value-enhancing asset restructuring. In low investor 
protection countries, the leverage effect seems to work to the detriment of investors. As 
leverage makes poorly performing firms more financially constrained, it reinforces the 
tendency to engage in value-reducing asset sales. 
B.3. Interaction between Union Laws and Investor Protection 
 Table VIII also shows that the relation between union laws and asset sales differs 
sharply depending on the strength of investor protection. With strong investor protection, 
strong union laws seem to discourage asset sales. With weak investor protection, stronger 
union laws lead to more asset sales, suggesting that workers sanction them because the 
proceeds help minimize layoffs and wage cuts.
25
 
 The positive relation between Union and Asset sales in low investor protection 
countries also rejects the asset tunneling hypothesis as an explanation for inferior 
operating performance following asset sales. With the tunneling hypothesis, there is no 
reason to expect a positive relation between asset diversion and union power. Instead, it 
predicts a negative relation, because workers may resist such asset reductions to protect 
their jobs. 
 Another possible explanation for our results concerning asset sales is that asset 
markets are less developed in low investor protection countries, making it difficult to 
meet cash demands without a fire sale. Fire sales, in turn, would lead to further 
deterioration, especially if they involve crown jewels. According to this story, as investor 
protection gets weaker, asset sales become more costly and will be undertaken only as a 
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last resort, resulting in fewer asset sales. But this prediction contradicts the results 
reported in Tables IV, VI, and VIII (for below-median countries), all of which show more 
asset sales as investor protection gets weaker. Yet another possible explanation is that 
creditors in weaker investor protection countries are more likely to refuse rolling over 
debt at maturity when firms suffer poor performance, leading to more fire sales. We 
investigate this possibility in the robustness section and find no support for it. 
 Because the management-labor alliance hypothesis implies that proceeds from 
asset sales are used to forestall employee layoffs, we examine how asset sales in the year 
of distress affect layoffs in the year following distress, separately for strong and weak 
investor protection countries. The results in Table IX are revealing. Although asset sales 
lead to a significantly higher likelihood of layoffs in strong investor protection countries, 
no such relation is observed in weak investor protection countries, from which we infer 
that proceeds from asset sales are used to avoid large scale layoffs. The interaction term 
between Asset Sales and Union reinforces this inference. In strong investor protection 
countries, strong union power helps reduce the incidence of large scale layoffs stemming 
from major asset sales. By contrast, in weak investor protection countries union power 
shows no such effect, because asset sales are done to minimize layoffs with workers’ 
sanction. 
 Finally, the alliance hypothesis predicts that in low investor protection countries 
management turnover is less likely with strong union laws. Thus, we again split the 
sample by the median investor protection and relate Union to management turnover. The 
results reported in Table X are consistent with the prediction: the likelihood of 
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countries.
26
 In these countries, a poorly performing firm in a bottom-quartile country in 
Union has a 12.33% chance of replacing management, but an otherwise similar firm in a 
top-quartile Union country has only an 8.07% chance of changing its management.  
 An alternative interpretation is that strong labor union laws make it easier for 
managers to avoid dismissal by blaming unions for poor performance. Unions have a 
reputation for refusing to adapt to new technologies reducing labor costs. Thus, a 
potential buyer is likely to demand a large discount to deal with uncooperative unions, 
forcing poorly performing firms to sell the corporate crown jewels. This may explain the 
low management turnover when labor unions are strong and the inferior performance 
following asset sales. However, this story also predicts that firms with stronger unions are 
less likely to sell assets because of the greater discount demanded by buyers. But this 
prediction is contrary to the positive relation between the strength of union laws and the 
likelihood of asset sales in weak investor protection countries shown in Table VIII (and 
Table IV).  
 In sum, our various regression estimates provide sufficient evidence in support of 
the management-labor alliance to conclude that strong union laws, together with weak 
investor protection, induce underperforming managers to resort to value-reducing asset 
sales to minimize worker layoffs. This, in turn, garners worker support to help incumbent 
managers retain their jobs.  
C. Robustness 
 We conduct numerous additional tests to examine whether our results are robust 
to different model specifications, alternative explanations, sample selection criteria, and 
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variable definitions. For brevity, we describe the results without reporting regression 
estimates.  
 Although we control for country random effects, we are concerned with omitted 
variables that affect both the legal protection of labor and investors and the likelihood of 
corporate restructuring. A possible candidate for concern is the business cycle, which 
may jointly affect the probability of restructuring and the legal protection of investors. 
For example, the Law and Order index, a component of Financier, may be reduced 
during recessions, when the frequency of asset sales also may increase. Although we 
control for macroeconomic factors by including year fixed effects, we additionally 
include the change in the logarithm of GDP per capita as a control variable. Our results 
remain unaffected. Controlling for inflation and using the change in unemployment level, 
instead of the change in GDP per capita, do not affect our results.  
 It is possible that our results concerning asset sales and layoffs are due to 
systematic pre-distress differences across countries. For example, companies may invest 
more (less) and employ more (less) workers in countries with strong investor (labor) 
protection during normal times (i.e., in the base year), leading to a positive (negative) 
spurious relation between investor (labor) protection and asset sales or layoffs during the 
distress year. To check this possibility, we estimate country random effects regressions 
relating NPPE scaled by sales in the base year and the number of employees scaled by 
sales in the base year to Financier, Emp_Cont, and Union, with industry and year fixed 
effects. We find no significant relations for any of the legal variables. 
 We also check whether our results on Asset sales are affected by asset liquidations 
to pay off debt. Creditors may refuse to roll over poorly performing firms’ debt at 
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maturity, forcing asset liquidations. We do not find a significant correlation between 
changes in NPPE and changes in short-term or total debt. However, there are small but 
significant correlations between Asset sales and debt changes.
27
 Thus, we re-estimate the 
regression models for Asset sales while replacing leverage with the change in short-term 
or total debt (not reported). The coefficients on the changes in both short-term and total 
debt are not significant for all specifications, while all other coefficients are very similar 
both in magnitude and significance to those reported in Table VIII.  
 Financial crises in Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, 
Brazil, and Argentina during our sample period may also affect our results. However, our 
sample includes only 57 observations from these countries during the year of the crisis 
and the following year because two-thirds of our observations are after 2000. Removing 
the 57 observations from analyses does not change our results. 
 To allow for the possibility that asset sales, layoffs, and turnover are jointly 
determined as a function of investor and labor protection, we estimate a seemingly 
unrelated regression model with linear probability specification. The results (unreported) 
are qualitatively similar. 
 We also use alternative proxies for some of our legal variables. For union power, 
we use the percentage of total workforce affiliated with labor unions provided by the 
International Labor Organization (2005) instead of Union. Further, we replace Law and 
Order with the judicial efficiency measure from Djankov et al. (2003). The results remain 
similar with both changes. 
 As an alternative measure of ownership concentration, we use the sum of the 
equity stakes of all shareholders with ownership greater than 5%. We also define 
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ownership concentration as the percentage of shares held by the largest stockholder. Our 
results do not change with these alternative definitions. When Worldscope does not 
provide managerial ownership data, we compare the last names and the first initials of the 
top three officers with those of the shareholders who own more than 5% of the shares. 
This adds noise because unrelated people often have the same last name, especially in 
East Asia. As a robustness check we drop all such matches for the East Asian companies. 
Our main results are unaffected.  
 For employee layoffs or asset sales, a firm enters our sample if its operating 
performance is above the industry median in the base year and experiences a drop in 
EBITDA greater than 50% in the distress year. To ensure that the base year performance 
is not a single-year phenomenon, we require that operating performance be above the 
industry median for two consecutive years prior to the distress year. We also use 40% and 
30% cutoff points for the drop in EBITDA. Our main results are robust to these changes 
in sample selection criteria. 
 The definition of leverage and how it triggers debt covenant violations varies 
across countries. For example, short-term debt in one country may be regarded as long-
term debt in another. Thus, we use other measures of leverage such as long-term debt to 
equity and long-term debt to total assets. Although the magnitude and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients on leverage and its interaction with the legal variables 
marginally decrease in some specifications, the main conclusions remain unchanged. 
Finally, to control for possible serial correlation owing to some firms entering the sample 
twice, we repeat our analysis with only the first time they become distressed. The results 
remain unchanged. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 We find that legal protection of labor and investors has pervasive effects on 
restructuring decisions, and some results are surprising. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that asset restructuring by poorly performing firms is value-enhancing, major 
asset sales in weak investor protection countries are followed by inferior performance. 
These value-reducing asset sales are more prevalent when union laws are stronger. 
Furthermore, poorly performing managers are more likely to retain their jobs when strong 
union laws are combined with weak investor protection. These findings point toward 
alliances formed between poorly performing managers and workers, who directly and 
indirectly protect top managers. Managers, in turn, refrain from worker layoffs and wage 
cuts by selling assets even when such sales hurt subsequent operating performance.  
 The general theme emerging from our study is that laws matter in determining the 
relative influence of different stakeholders on the corporate decision-making process. 
More important, our study demonstrates that investor protection and labor laws cannot be 
studied in isolation, because they are too closely intertwined in determining how firms 
respond to the competing incentives of investors, labor, and management.  
 Our results also illustrate that strong labor laws have unintended and undesirable 
consequences. Highly protective employment contract laws exacerbate workers’ plight by 
inducing more major asset sales during corporate distress. Strong union laws help 
underperforming managers avoid dismissal through worker-management alliances. 
 Although these labor laws are not optimal ex post, they may represent equilibrium 
responses to conflicts among stakeholders in countries subject to different political and 
social environments. Furthermore, laws concerning consumer protection, environment, 
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and taxes intended to protect other stakeholders may also have important intertwining 
influences on firm behavior during distress, or more broadly in shaping corporate 
governance. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing corporate governance researchers is to 
understand the interplay among the various political, social, and legal factors to prescribe 
appropriate policies for countries and companies that are subject to different 
environments.  
     35
References 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 2005, Does financial 
liberalization spur growth? Journal of Financial Economics 77, 3-56. 
Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 1999, Is there discretion in wage setting? 
Rand Journal of Economics 30, 535-554. 
Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003, Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate 
governance and managerial preferences, Journal of Political Economy 111, 1043-
1075. 
Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess, 2004, Can labor regulation hinder economic 
performance? Evidence from India, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 91-134. 
Botero, Juan C., Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Andrei Shleifer, 2004, The regulation of labor, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 
1339-1382. 
Breusch, Trevor S., and Adrian R. Pagan, 1980, The Lagrange multiplier test and its 
applications to model specification in econometrics, Review of Economic Studies 47, 
239-253. 
Bronars, Stephen G., and Donald R. Deere, 1991, The threat of unionization, the use of 
debt and the preservation of shareholder wealth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 
231- 254. 
Business Week, 2005, The Real Scandal at Volkswagen; Behind the fraud and corruption 
probe is a company that has lost its way, July 18. 
     36
Denis, David J., and Timothy A. Kruse, 2000, Managerial discipline and corporate 
restructuring following performance declines, Journal of Financial Economics 55, 
391-424. 
Denis, Diane K., and John J. McConnell, 2003, International corporate governance, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 1-38. 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 
2003, Courts, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 453-517. 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 
2005, The law and economics of self-dealing, Working paper, Harvard University. 
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, 2006, Private credits in 129 
countries, Working paper, Harvard University. 
Doidge, Craig, G. Andrew Karolyi, and René M. Stulz, 2004, Why are foreign firms 
listed in the U.S. worth more? Journal of Financial Economics 71, 205-238. 
Doidge, Craig, G. Andrew Karolyi, and René M. Stulz, 2007, Why do countries matter so 
much for corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics 86, 1-39. 
Durnev, Art, and E. Han Kim, 2005, To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal 
environment, and valuation, Journal of Finance 60, 1461-1494. 
Fauver, Larry, and Michael E. Fuerst, 2006, Does good corporate governance include 
employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards, Journal of 
Financial Economics 82, 673-710. 
Foerster, Stephen, R., and G. Andrew Karolyi, 1999, The effects of market segmentation 
and investor recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the 
United States, Journal of Finance 54, 981-1013. 
     37
Gorton, Gary, and Frank A. Schmid, 2000, Universal banking and the performance of 
German firms, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 29-80. 
Hallock, Kevin, 1998, Layoffs, top executive pay, and firm performance, American 
Economic Review 88, 711-723. 
International Labor Organization, 2005, Laborsta (http:/laborsta.ilo.org). 
Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
Johnson, Simon, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, and Eric Friedman, 2000, Corporate 
governance in the Asian financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141-
186. 
Kang, Jun-Koo, and Anil Shivdasani, 1997, Corporate restructuring during performance 
declines in Japan, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 29-65. 
Kaplan, Steven, 1994, Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of 
Japan and the United States, Journal of Political Economy 102, 510-546. 
Kim, E. Han, and Paige Ouimet, 2007, Employee capitalism or corporate socialism? 
Broad-based employee stock ownership, Working paper, University of Michigan. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, 2000, 
Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-
27. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, 2002, 
Investor protection and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance 57, 1147-1171. 
Norton, Edward C., Hua Wang, and Chunrong Ai, 2004, Computing interaction effects 
and standard errors in logit and probit models, Stata Journal 4, 103-116. 
     38
O'Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin, 1999, Doing it now or later, American Economic 
Review 89, 103-124. 
Ofek, Eli, 1993, Capital structure and firm response to poor performance, Journal of 
Financial Economics 34, 3-30. 
Pagano, Marco, and Paolo Volpin, 2005, Managers, workers, and corporate control, 
Journal of Finance 60, 841- 868. 
Rauh, Joshua, 2006, Own company stock in defined contribution pension funds: A 
takeover defense? Journal of Financial Economics 81, 379-410. 
Roberts, Michael R., and Amir Sufi, 2006, Control rights and capital structure: An 
empirical investigation, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Roe, Mark, 2003, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford). 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Larry Summers, 1988, Breach of trust in hostile takeovers, in Alan 
J. Auerbach, ed.: Corporate Takeovers (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon, 2002, Investor protection and equity markets, 
Journal of Financial Economics 6, 3-27. 
Tirole, Jean, 2001, Corporate governance, Econometrica 69, 1-35. 
Volpin, Paolo F., 2002, Governance with poor investor protection: Evidence from top 
executive turnover in Italy, Journal of Financial Economics 64, 61-90. 





See for example, La Porta et al. (2000, 2002), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2004, 2007). For a survey of the literature, see Denis and McConnell 
(2003).  
2
 See, for example, Ofek (1993), Kaplan (1994), Kang and Shivdasani (1997), and Denis 
and Kruse (2000). 
3
 This result is not due to firms selling assets because of their continuing poor operating 
performance. Our sample of asset sales is restricted to those that occur at the onset of a 
sharp decline in operating performance by firms that previously performed above the 
industry median. 
4
 The first assumption simplifies our theoretical analyses and allows us to work with a 
single investor protection index for most of our empirical analyses. However, it ignores 
possible conflicts between shareholders and creditors regarding the timing of 
restructuring due to shareholders’ convex claims on the firm’s cash flows and creditors’ 
concave claims. We address this issue by examining the sensitivity of our empirical 
results to separate indices of shareholder and creditor rights. We also examine the timing 
issue in the robustness section. 
5
 Rauh (2006) finds that employee stock ownership through defined contribution plans 
has a deterrent effect on takeover probability, and Kim and Ouimet (2008) document a 
substantial increase in employee compensation following the adoption of large-scale 
employee stock ownership plans. The compensation increases are concentrated in firms 
incorporated in states with business combination statutes, which make ESOPs more 
effective anti-takeover device against hostile takeover attempts.  
6
 The supervisory board has the power to appoint and dismiss management board 
members, who report to the supervisory board in the two-tiered board system. See Gorton 
and Schmid (2000) and Fauver and Fuerst (2006) for further discussion of the German 
board system. 
7 The strength of German union laws ranks seventh among our sample of 41 countries, 
while the strength of its investor protection is slightly below the median (see Table II). 
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8
 The other German automakers are BMW, DaimlerChrysler, and Porsche, and the 
worldwide list includes Fiat, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, 
Nissan, Peugeot, Renault, Suzuki, and Toyota. 
9 We do not include time slopes because that requires interacting explanatory variables 
with year indicator variables, exacerbating the multicollinearity problem. 
10
 We exclude the firm-years with missing data for any of the relevant variables. We also 
exclude firm-years in which sales, total assets, and the number of employees are zero and 
leverage ratios are greater than one or negative. 
11
 Because some countries have an insufficient number of firms that conform to the 
traditional definition of industry grouping, to identify underperforming management we 
use a more flexible industry definition. If more than five firms have the same three-digit 
SIC code in a given country in a given year, we use the three-digit SIC group. Otherwise, 
we use the two-digit SIC group if there are more than five firms with the same two-digit 
SIC code. Likewise, we use the one-digit SIC group if there are less than five firms in the 
two-digit group, and the rest of the companies in the same country when there is an 
insufficient number of firms in the one-digit group. Finally, if there are less than five 
firms in a given country in any given year, we drop that country from the sample for that 
year. 
12
 We exclude financial restructuring such as debt renegotiation, debt forgiveness, or debt 
equity swaps because they represent restructuring claims between investors without much 
direct involvement of workers. We also exclude bankruptcies and mergers because of 
data unavailability for the 41 countries. The impact of these omissions is likely to be very 
small. Only 1.58% of our sample firms disappear during the year of distress (0.61%) and 
the following year (0.97%), which may be due to bankruptcy, mergers, or Worldscope’s 
decision to stop covering them for other reasons. The low percentage of disappearance 
reflects the fact that the firms were outperforming their industry rivals prior to the year of 
distress and that the performance drop is sudden, not prolonged.  
13
 This language problem prevents us from examining the announcement effects of 
restructuring decisions. Unlike other international studies with identifiable dates through 
sources written in English (e.g., the listing date of foreign stocks in the U.S. by Foerster 
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and Karolyi (1999)), identifying announcement dates for our sample of firms would 
require searching newspapers and media reports in the local language. This is practically 
impossible because of our large sample size covering 41 countries.  
14
 Kang and Shivdasani (1997) identify layoffs and asset sales through newspaper 
articles, and report a mean (median) layoff of 20.9% (20%) of their total workforce and a 
median asset sale of 7.5% of total assets. We use a 15% cutoff rate for asset sales because 
Denis and Kruse (2000) report a higher reduction in total assets for their sample (28.2%). 
15
 The variables Creditor and Law and Order reported in Table II are the yearly averages 
over the period 1993 to 2003. Unlike these indices, the revised anti-director index and the 
anti-self-dealing index are time invariant, as are the labor law indices. However, it is 
comforting that Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006) find “…creditor rights are 
remarkably stable over time, contrary to the hypothesis that legal rules are converging.” 
(p. 1) Furthermore, two-thirds of our sample firm-years cover a relatively short period of 
time, 2000 to 2004, making the results less sensitive to changes in laws over time. 
Finally, to the extent that these time-invariant indices incorrectly measure the legal 
environment at the time of declining performance, the noise blurs the distinction in legal 
variables across countries, weakening the power of our tests. 
16 We find no statistically significant relation between Soc_Sec and the likelihood of any 
of the three restructuring measures. Consequently, we do not report results dealing with 
Soc_Sec. 
17
 GDP per capita is also closely related to the degree of stock market openness and Law 
and Order, which Table III shows is highly correlated with social security laws. Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) find that stock market liberalization leads to a 1% increase 
in annual economic growth and the effect is greater for countries with higher Law and 
Order. 
18
 Two-thirds of the distressed firms (7,269 firm-years) come from 2000 to 2004, 
reducing the noise in this proxy variable. 
19
 The number of observations for Layoffs, Asset sales, and Management turnover is 
smaller than the total number of observations because of missing data for employees, 
NPPE, and officer names for two consecutive years in Worldscope. In addition, 
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Management turnover comes from a sample based on a different definition of poor 
performance. 
20
 Volpin (2002) finds that the likelihood of CEO turnover for Italian companies depends 
on whether the top executive is (a family member of) the controlling shareholder. 
21
 The median (mean) total assets during the distress year is $200,500 ($5,546,947) and 
$430,936 ($214,000,000) for the highest- and lowest-quartile investor protection 
countries, respectively. The corresponding sales figures are $156,014 ($6,418,417) and 
$344,154 ($72,400,000), and the number of employees is 675 (3,282) and 727 (4,014), 
respectively. We reach the same conclusion when we break the sample by the median 
strength of investor protection. 
22
 The sample size is substantially smaller than other regressions because we require at 
least four consecutive years of data per company and a large fraction of our sample firms 
appear for the first time during the last three years of our sample period. 
23
 Of the four control variables, the most noticeable is size, which shows a significant 
negative correlation regardless of how post-distress performance is measured and of the 
strength of investor protection. Perhaps smaller firms are better able to recover from 
distress because they tend to have higher managerial ownership, less unionized 
workforces, and more flexibility. 
24
 We also repeat the analysis in Panel A of Table VII for layoffs and management 
turnover. The results (unreported) confirm that both layoffs and management turnover 
improve the subsequent operating performance regardless of investor protection. 
25 Sometimes more than one restructuring action is taken at a given time. We identify 
cases where only one action is taken and re-estimate regressions. The results are similar 
for “pure” layoffs and “pure” management turnover (not reported). For “pure” asset sales, 
however, the coefficients on the legal variable become somewhat more significant both 
statistically and economically. For example, when we replace Asset sales with pure asset 
sales for estimation in Table VIII, the coefficient on Union becomes more positive for 
low investor protection countries. The stronger result for pure asset sales is noteworthy. 
Pure asset sales can be an outcome of a “successful” management-labor alliance, wherein 
management sells assets to avoid large scale layoffs and retain their own jobs. 
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26
 We also re-estimate the same regression for the total sample with an additional 
interaction term between Union and an indicator variable for above-median investor 
protection. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant, and the rest 
of the coefficients are qualitatively similar. 
27
 Asset sales are correlated with changes in short term debt (correlation coefficients of  
-0.03 and -0.08 for high and low creditor protection countries, respectively) and with 
changes in total debt for low creditor protection countries (correlation coefficient of -
0.08). 
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Table I 
 Variable Descriptions 





































































Legal Variables  
(A higher score indicates stronger legal protection) 
 
Equal to the sum of six sub-indices at the country level that assess the possibility of proxy voting by mail, 
blocking shares before a shareholder meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, preemptive rights, and the 
percentage of share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting (measured at the country level, 
time invariant). (Source: Djankov et al. (2005)) 
 
Measures the amount of disclosure before and after the transaction has occurred, the need for approval by 
disinterested shareholders, and litigation governing a specific self-dealing transaction (measured at the country 
level, time invariant). (Source: Djankov et al. (2005)) 
 
Equal to the sum of normalized values of Anti-director and Anti-self-dealing. (Source: Djankov et al. (2005)) 
 
Evaluates whether there is no automatic stay on assets, whether secured creditors are paid first, whether there are 
restrictions on going into reorganization, and whether management stays in the reorganization (measured at the 
country level, annual frequency, lagged by one period). (Source: Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006)) 
 
Measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system and of the popular observance of the law 
(measured at the country level, annual frequency, lagged by one period). (Source: International Country Risk 
Guide) 
 
Equal to the sum of the normalized values of Anti-director, Anti-self-dealing, Creditor, and Law and Order 
(measured at the country level, annual frequency). (Source: Djankov et al. (2005); Djankov, McLeish, and 
Shleifer (2006)) 
 
Measures the difficulty and the costs of reducing wages and working hours, and covers regulations concerning 
overtime and use of temporary workers (measured at the country level, time invariant). (Source: Botero et al. 
(2004) 
 
Assesses the legal protection of labor unions and the regulation of collective disputes (measured at the country 
level, time invariant). (Source: Botero et al. (2004)) 
 




 (All restructuring variables are employed at the annual frequency) 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the decrease in the number of employees is greater than 20%. (Source: 
Worldscope) 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if there is a change in the top two officers of the firm. (Source: Worldscope, 
Amadeus, the ISI Emerging Markets Database, local stock exchanges, and company websites) 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if there is a drop in NPPE  greater than 15%. (Source: Worldscope) 
 
Firm-level control variables  
(All firm-level variables are employed at the annual frequency) 
 
Operating income before depreciation and amortization. (Source: Worldscope) 
 
Total assets. (Source: Worldscope) 
 
Equal to the logarithm of sales. (Source: Worldscope) 
 
Equal to the ratio of (long-term debt + short-term debt) to total assets. (Source: Worldscope) 
 
Net property, plant, and equipment. (Source: Worldscope) 
 
The total percentage owned by the three largest shareholders who own more than 5% of the shares. (Source: 
Worldscope, Amadeus, the ISI Emerging Markets Database, local stock exchanges, and company websites) 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if any of the top officers owns more than 5% of the shares or shares the same 
last name and first initial with any of the major shareholders who own more than 5%. (Source: Worldscope, 
Amadeus, the ISI Emerging Markets Database, local stock exchanges, and company websites) 
 
Equal to the change in EBITDA/TA. (Source: Worldscope) 
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Table II 


















Order Financier Union Emp_Cont Soc_Sec 
Argentina  112 13 0.12 0.5 0.45 0.25 0.79 1.99 0.58 0.34 0.72 
Australia  2,176 287 0.13 0.67 0.79 0.75 1.00 3.21 0.37 0.35 0.78 
Austria  846 131 0.15 0.42 0.21 0.75 1.00 2.38 0.36 0.5 0.71 
Belgium  1,183 148 0.13 0.33 0.54 0.50 0.86 2.23 0.42 0.51 0.62 
Brazil  699 116 0.17 0.83 0.29 0.25 0.37 1.74 0.38 0.57 0.55 
Canada  2,444 247 0.10 0.67 0.65 0.25 1.00 2.57 0.2 0.26 0.79 
Chile  579 36 0.06 0.67 0.63 0.50 0.83 2.63 0.38 0.47 0.69 
Colombia  169 16 0.09 0.5 0.58 0.00 0.26 1.34 0.49 0.34 0.81 
Denmark  1,703 180 0.11 0.67 0.47 0.75 1.00 2.89 0.42 0.57 0.87 
Finland  1,141 169 0.15 0.58 0.46 0.25 1.00 2.29 0.32 0.74 0.79 
France  6,383 811 0.13 0.5 0.38 0.00 0.84 1.72 0.67 0.74 0.78 
Germany  6,650 832 0.13 0.42 0.28 0.75 0.92 2.37 0.61 0.7 0.67 
Greece  1,147 223 0.19 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.53 1.34 0.49 0.52 0.74 
Hong Kong  2,149 292 0.14 0.83 0.97 1.00 0.81 3.61 0.46 0.17 0.81 
India  587 54 0.09 0.83 0.55 0.50 0.67 2.55 0.38 0.44 0.4 
Indonesia  836 104 0.12 0.67 0.69 0.50 0.36 2.22 0.39 0.68 0.18 
Ireland  616 79 0.13 0.67 0.79 0.25 0.99 2.70 0.46 0.34 0.71 
Israel  207 27 0.13 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.83 2.97 0.31 0.29 0.81 
Italy  2,242 292 0.13 0.42 0.39 0.50 0.93 2.24 0.63 0.65 0.76 
Japan  21,923 2,154 0.10 0.58 0.48 0.49 0.91 2.46 0.63 0.16 0.64 
South Korea  3,014 367 0.12 0.58 0.46 0.75 0.78 2.57 0.54 0.45 0.68 
Malaysia  1,765 280 0.16 0.83 0.95 0.75 0.52 3.05 0.19 0.19 0.2 
Mexico  369 38 0.10 0.5 0.18 0.00 0.36 1.04 0.58 0.59 0.51 
Netherlands  1,756 219 0.12 0.5 0.21 0.75 1.00 2.46 0.46 0.73 0.63 
New Zealand  217 28 0.13 0.67 0.95 1.00 1.00 3.62 0.25 0.16 0.72 
Norway  1,292 166 0.13 0.58 0.44 0.50 1.00 2.52 0.65 0.69 0.83 
Pakistan  302 37 0.12 0.67 0.41 0.25 0.50 1.83 0.31 0.34 0.47 
Peru  299 52 0.17 0.58 0.41 0.00 0.50 1.49 0.71 0.46 0.42 
Philippines  609 81 0.13 0.5 0.24 0.25 0.45 1.44 0.51 0.48 0.49 
Portugal  551 78 0.14 0.42 0.52 0.25 0.86 2.04 0.65 0.81 0.74 
Singapore  1,186 201 0.17 0.83 1 0.75 1.00 3.58 0.34 0.31 0.46 
South Africa  1,605 185 0.12 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.36 2.76 0.54 0.32 0.58 
Spain  1,452 161 0.11 0.83 0.37 0.50 0.73 2.44 0.59 0.74 0.77 
Sweden  2,146 220 0.10 0.58 0.34 0.26 1.00 2.18 0.54 0.74 0.84 
Switzerland  1,679 215 0.13 0.5 0.27 0.25 0.96 1.98 0.42 0.45 0.82 
Taiwan  888 111 0.13 0.5 0.56 0.50 0.67 2.23 0.32 0.45 0.75 
Thailand  1,078 163 0.15 0.67 0.85 0.52 0.83 2.87 0.36 0.41 0.47 
Turkey  599 39 0.07 0.33 0.43 0.50 0.65 1.91 0.47 0.4 0.48 
United Kingdom  14,984 1,428 0.10 0.83 0.93 1.00 1.00 3.76 0.19 0.28 0.69 
United States  13,787 647 0.05 0.5 0.65 0.25 1.00 2.40 0.26 0.22 0.65 
Zimbabwe  41 5 0.12 0.67 0.44 1.00 0.27 2.37 0.44 0.25 0.16 
Mean Values 2,522 267 0.11 0.6 0.54 0.49 0.76 2.39 0.45 0.46 0.64 
Median Values 1,147 163 0.13 0.58 0.47 0.50 0.83 2.38 0.44 0.45 0.69 
St Deviation 4,426 405 0.03 0.15 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.64 0.14 0.19 0.18 
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Table III 
Correlations between Legal Variables and Summary Statistics of Firm Variables 
Panel A shows correlations between legal variables. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Panel B 
shows summary statistics for firm level variables for base year and distress year. The differences between 
distress year and base year are significant at the 1% level for all variables except Leverage.  
 







Order Financier Emp_Cont Union Soc_Sec 
Anti-director (revised) 1.000        
Anti-self-dealing 0.809 1.000       
Creditor 0.534 0.532 1.000      
Law-and-Order -0.044 0.087 0.200 1.000     
Financier 0.777 0.831 0.854 0.373 1.000    
Emp_Cont -0.441 -0.570 -0.278 -0.083 -0.469 1.000   
Union -0.559 -0.710 -0.412 -0.149 -0.634 0.326 1.000  
Soc_Sec -0.218 -0.261 -0.133 0.467 -0.083 0.311 0.183 1.000 
Panel B. Summary statistics for firm level variables for base year and distress year 
  Mean  Median 
 Observations (Base Yr) (Distress Yr)  (Base Yr) (Distress Yr) 
Total Assets 10,904 341,281,384 252,517,008  2,285,876 1,207,550 
EBITDA 10,904 41,117,403 5,329,037  1,731,763 51,970 
Sales 10,904 144,136,826 99,183,869  2,168,990 843,429 
Leverage 10,904 0.237 0.238  0.210 0.214 
Employees 10,904 4,562 4,168  931 820 
NPPE 10,904 49,837,471 37,481,174  517,909 245,356 
Short term debt 10,904 37,242,789 26,697,060  79,375 43,258 
Long term debt 10,904 34,051,580 24,415,869  101,224 56,473 
Layoffs 10,065 0.050 0.071  0 0 
Asset sales 10,777 0.120 0.184  0 0 
Management 
turnover 7,358 0.063 0.083 
 
0 0 




Average Proportions of Poorly-Performing Firms by Restructuring Type in Top- and Bottom 
Quartile Countries by Legal Variable 
 
The statistical significance in the differences between top and bottom quartiles is indicated by * for significance at the 
10% level, ** for significance at the 5% level, and *** for significance at the 1% level. 
 Emp_Cont Union Financier 
 Quartile  Quartile  Quartile  
 Top Bottom Diff Top Bottom Diff Top Bottom Diff 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Layoffs  0.069 0.045    0.024*** 0.044 0.107 -0.063*** 0.099 0.042 0.057*** 
Asset Sales 0.333 0.066    0.267*** 0.177 0.139   0.038*** 0.144 0.254 -0.110*** 
Management 
Turnover 0.075    0.088 -0.013 0.079 0.096    -0.017** 0.093 0.076    0.017** 
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Table V 
Likelihood of Employee Layoffs or Management Turnover 
 
Panel A shows results of country random effects logit regressions using employee layoffs as the dependent variable. 
Specifically:  




Pr( 1) ( *
* )
ik k k ik ik ik k
ik k j ikj ik
j
R F Financier Labor Lev Own Lev Financier
Lev Labor X
     
  

      
  
where Rik is Layoffs for firm i in country k and F(.) is the logit specification. Labor is either Union (columns 1-3), or 
Emp_Cont (columns 4-6). The vector of control variables Xijk includes Performance and Size. All specifications are 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country and include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects at the 
two-digit level, and country random effects. P-values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Panel A: Likelihood of employee layoffs 
 Labor is Union  Labor is Emp_Cont 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Financier 0.162** 0.054* 0.162**  0.348*** 0.241** 0.352*** 
  (0.031) (0.095) (0.031)  (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
Union -1.087*** -1.088*** -1.072**     
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.014)     
Emp_Cont     0.081 0.085 0.337 
      (0.732) (0.721) (0.319) 
Leverage 0.605*** 0.618 0.630*  0.615*** 0.606 1.013** 
  (0.004) (0.444) (0.058)  (0.003) (0.455) (0.017) 
Own 0.437** 0.359** 0.336  0.342** 0.215** 0.209 
  (0.047) (0.031) (0.217)  (0.076) (0.088) (0.372) 
Size -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047***  -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Performance -0.457*** -0.457*** -0.457***  -0.449*** -0.449*** -0.450*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev*Financier  0.457*    0.456*  
   (0.072)    (0.087)  
Lev*Union   0.058*     
    (0.095)     
Lev*Emp_Cont       0.965 
        (0.284) 
Observations 10,013 10,013 10,013  10,013 10,013 10,013 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.037 0.038 0.037  0.035 0.035 0.035 
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Table V 
Likelihood of Employee Layoffs or Management Turnover 
 
Panel B shows results of country random effects logit regressions using management turnover as the dependent 
variable. Specifically:  




Pr( 1) ( *
* )
ik k k ik ik ik k
ik k j ikj ik
j
R F Financier Labor Lev Own Lev Financier
Lev Labor X
     
  

      
  
 
where Rik is Layoffs for firm i in country k and F(.) is the logit specification. Labor is either Union (columns 1-3), or 
Emp_Cont (columns 4-6). The vector of control variables Xijk includes Performance and Size. All specifications are 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country and include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects at the 
two-digit level, and country random effects. P-values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Panel B: Likelihood of management turnover 
 Labor is Union  Labor is Emp_Cont 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Financier 0.104 0.188* 0.106  0.183** 0.268** 0.186** 
  (0.210) (0.097) (0.199)  (0.026) (0.016) (0.025) 
Union -0.666** -0.664** -0.570     
  (0.047) (0.048) (0.213)     
Emp_Cont     -0.110 -0.110 0.005 
      (0.657) (0.659) (0.988) 
Leverage 0.148* 1.117* 0.323  0.163* 1.144 0.343 
  (0.094) (0.097) (0.601)  (0.052) (0.218) (0.439) 
Own 0.302* 0.255 0.241  0.273 0.444 0.351 
  (0.094) (0.369) (0.380)  (0.401) (0.18) (0.273) 
Size 0.030** 0.031** 0.030**  0.017 0.017 0.017 
  (0.035) (0.032) (0.035)  (0.246) (0.228) (0.248) 
Performance -0.062 -0.063 -0.062  -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 
  (0.169) (0.163) (0.171)  (0.192) (0.186) (0.191) 
Lev*Financier  0.376    0.381*  
   (0.284)    (0.081)  
Lev*Union   -0.374     
    (0.765)     
Lev*Emp_Cont       -0.451 
        (0.641) 
Observations 7,309 7,309 7,309  7,309 7,309 7,309 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.039 0.040 0.040  0.033 0.034 0.034 
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Table VI 
Likelihood of Layoffs, Management Turnover, or Asset Sales, Controlling for  
Major Shareholder-Top Manager 
 
This table reports the results of country random effects logit regressions using Layoffs, Management turnover, or 
Asset sales as the dependent variable, while controlling for major shareholder-top manager:  
7
1 2 3 4 5
6
Pr( 1) ( / )ik k k ik ik ik j ikj ik
j
R F Financier Labor Lev Own Mgmt Own X       

        
where Rik is a measure of restructuring: Layoffs in columns 1 and 2, Turnover in columns 3 and 4 and Asset Sales in 
columns 5 and 6. Labor is either Emp_Cont (columns 1, 3, and 5), or Union (columns 2, 4, and 6).  The vector of 
control variables Xijk includes Performance and Size. The number of observations is smaller because data on top 
officer ownership is not available for all firms in the full sample. All specifications are estimated with robust 
standard errors clustered by country and include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects at the two-digit level, and 
country random effects. P-values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
  Layoffs  Turnover  Asset Sales 
  Emp_Cont  Union  Emp_Cont  Union  Emp_Cont  Union 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Financier  0.092**  0.227**  0.091*  0.089*  -0.333***  -0.742*** 
   (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.094)  (0.096)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Emp_Cont  0.047    -0.335    2.549***   
   (0.896)    (0.382)    (0.000)   
Union    -1.902***    -0.352*    0.333 
     (0.000)    (0.079)    (0.363) 
Leverage  0.997***  0.999***  0.572*  0.555*  0.337*  0.460* 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.078)  (0.087)  (0.085)  (0.059) 
Own  0.229**  0.298*  0.099  0.215*  0.271*  0.166 
   (0.044)  (0.093)  (0.377)  (0.085)  (0.092)  (0.438) 
Mgmt/Own  -0.272  -0.243  -0.709**  -0.736**  -0.415*  -0.388* 
   (0.402)  (0.459)  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.064)  (0.052) 
Size  -0.117***  -0.056**  -0.015  0.004  -0.134***  -0.164*** 
   (0.000)  (0.041)  (0.490)  (0.883)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Performance  -0.546***  -0.551***  -0.111*  -0.113*  -0.397***  -0.356*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.095)  (0.093)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  3,902  3,902  2,914  2,914  4,283  4,283 
Pseudo R
2
  0.052  0.060  0.041  0.041  0.102  0.068 
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Table VII 
Effects of Asset Sales, Layoffs, or Management Turnover on Operating Performance in 
Strong vs. Weak Investor Protection Countries 
 
Panel A shows the change in operating performance and percentage of firms dropping from the sample for firms 
with and without asset sales (Asales = 1 and Asales = 0, respectively) located in top or bottom Financier quartile 
countries. The change in performance is measured by subtracting performance in the distress year t from the average 
performance in the two-year period following the distress year – avg Performance (t+1,t+2). In rows 1-3, 
performance is measured by the ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization to total assets 
(EBITDA/TA). In rows 4-6, performance is measured by the ratio of sales to total assets (Sales/TA). Rows 7-9 show 
the percentage of firms dropping from the sample from year t to year t+2. Median values are reported in rows 1-6. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
Panel A: Operating performance following asset sales or no asset sales 
  
Top financier quartile  Bottom financier quartile 
 Top financier – 
Bottom financier 
Measure  
Avg Performance (t+1,t+2) 
– Performance (t) 
 
Avg Performance (t+1,t+2)   – 
Performance (t) 
 Difference 
EBITDA/TA       
    Asales=1 (1) 0.122***  -0.041**  0.163*** 
    Asales=0 (2) 0.117**  0.058***  0.059* 
    Difference (3) 0.005**  -0.099***  0.104*** 
Sales/TA       
    Asales=1 (4) 0.080**  -0.019*  0.099*** 
    Asales=0 (5) 0.029**  0.013  0.016* 




      
    Asales=1 (7) -3.4%  -8.7%  5.3%*** 
    Asales=0 (8) -4.2%  -2.6%  -1.6% 
    Difference (9) 0.8%  -6.1%***  6.9%*** 
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Table VII 
Effects of Asset Sales, Layoffs, or Management Turnover on Operating Performance in  
Strong vs. Weak Investor Protection Countries 
 
Panel B reports country fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of asset sales, employee layoffs, or management turnover on subsequent operating 
performance of companies located in countries below and above the median of Financier protection. The dependent variable is the change in average 
operating performance over the two-year period following the distress year. In columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10 performance is measured by the ratio of 
operating income before depreciation and amortization to total assets (EBITDA/TA). In columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 performance is measured by the 
ratio of sales to total assets (Sales/TA). Observation numbers vary between columns. All specifications are estimated with robust standard errors clustered 
by country and include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects at the two-digit level, and country fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 












Change in  
Sales/TA 
  Fin<Med Fin>Med Fin<Med Fin>Med Fin<Med Fin>Med Fin<Med Fin>Med Fin<Med Fin>Med Fin<Med Fin>Med 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Asset sales -0.077* 0.126* -0.019* 0.086*                 
  (0.058) (0.051) (0.063) (0.093)                 
Layoffs         0.213* 0.217** 0.098* 0.017         
          (0.072) (0.027) (0.050) (0.671)         
Turnover                 0.183* 0.060* 0.005* 0.009* 
                  (0.059) (0.066) (0.068) (0.073) 
Size -0.124*** -0.139*** -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.129*** -0.136*** -0.061*** -0.056*** -0.152*** -0.120*** -0.008* -0.015*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.108 -0.242* 0.036 0.056 -0.156 -0.346** 0.021 0.054 -0.001 -0.259* 0.045 0.034 
  (0.451) (0.073) (0.546) (0.298) (0.295) (0.013) (0.737) (0.332) (0.995) (0.087) (0.292) (0.347) 
Own 0.280 0.127 -0.109 -0.087 0.349 0.142 -0.058 -0.102 0.289 0.094 -0.073 -0.089 
  (0.387) (0.328) (0.426) (0.491) (0.201) (0.482) (0.4.19) (0.231) (0.339) (0.301) (0.284) (0.422) 
Performance -0.055 -0.070* 0.034 0.056*** -0.050 -0.032 0.034 0.062*** -0.012 0.012 0.029* -0.025* 
  (0.267) (0.098) (0.103) (0.001) (0.320) (0.493) (0.108) (0.001) (0.850) (0.826) (0.058) (0.062) 
Observations 2,097 2,821 2,097 2,821 1,996 2,597 1,996 2,597 1,390 1,861 1,390 1,861 
R
2
 0.040 0.037 0.050 0.041 0.044 0.041 0.053 0.040 0.048 0.029 0.015 0.012 
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Table VIII 
Joint Effects of Investor and Labor Protection on the Likelihood of Asset Sales 
 
 This table shows results of country random effects logit regressions using Asset Sales as the dependent variable for firms 
located in countries above and below the median of Financier protection. Specifically: 
1 2 3 4 5
7
6
Pr( 1) ( *
)
ik k k ik ik ik k
j ikj ik
j
Asales F Financier Labor Lev Own Lev Financier
X
     
 

      
 
 
Asalesik is Asset Sales for firm i in country k. F(.) is the logit specification. Labor is either Emp_Cont (Columns 1-2 and 
5-6), or Union (Columns 3-4 and 7-8). The vector of control variables Xikj includes Performance and Size. Columns 1-4 
estimate the model for the sub-sample of firms located in countries with above the median Financier, while columns 5-8 
estimate the model for the sub-sample of firms located in countries with below the median Financier. All specifications 
are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country and include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, at 
the two-digit level, and country random effects. P-values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 Financier>Median  Financier<Median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Financier 0.715*** 0.877*** 0.053* 0.131*  -0.310*** -0.361** -0.497*** -0.528*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.081)  (0.004) (0.025) (0.000) (0.001) 
Emp_Cont 2.666*** 2.657***    2.296*** 2.297***   
  (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000)   
Union   -0.450* -0.462    1.580*** 1.581*** 
    (0.089) (0.176)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.012* 2.245** 0.016* 2.592*  0.135** 0.319 0.200* 0.074 
  (0.062) (0.016) (0.096) (0.088)  (0.046) (0.767) (0.062) (0.944) 
Own 0.318* 0.174 0.197* 0.105  0.309** 0.337 0.375* 0.217 
  (0.078) (0.316) (0.071) (0.331)  (0.034) (0.145) (0.077) (0.259) 
Size -0.044** -0.045** -0.089*** -0.089***  -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.236*** -0.236*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Performance -0.339*** -0.339*** -0.340*** -0.339***  -0.483*** -0.484*** -0.492*** -0.492*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev*Financier  0.736*  0.840   -0.222*  -0.134 
   (0.073)  (0.190)   (0.075)  (0.796) 
Observations 5,323 5,323 5,323 5,323  5,318 5,318 5,318 5,318 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.045 0.046 0.029 0.030  0.144 0.144 0.119 0.119 
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 Table IX 
Differential Effects of Asset Sales on the Likelihood of Layoffs by 
Investor and Labor Protection 
 
 This table reports the results of country random effects logit regressions using Employee Layoffs in year t+1 as the dependent 
variable for firms located in countries above and below the median of Financier protection. Specifically: 
( 1) 1 2 3 4
10
5 6 7 8
9
Pr( 1) ( *
* * )
ik t ikt k k ikt k
ik ik ik k ik k j ikj ik
j
Layoffs F ASales Financier Union ASales Union
Lev Own Lev Financier Lev Union X
    
     


     
     
 
Layoffsik(t+1) is Employee Layoffs at time t+1, and Asalesikt are Asset Sales at time t. F(.) is the logit specification. The vector of 
control variables Xikj includes Performance and Size. Columns 1-3 estimate the model for the sub-sample of firms located in 
countries with above the median financier protection, while columns 4-6 estimate the model for the sub-sample of firms 
located in countries with below the median financier protection. All specifications are estimated with robust standard errors 
clustered by country and include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects at the two-digit level, and country random effects. P-
values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
 Financier>Median  Financier<Median 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Asset Sales 1.707*** 1.706*** 1.699***  0.648 0.660 0.643 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.229) (0.219) (0.229) 
Financier 0.262** 0.028** 0.288  0.921*** 1.848*** 0.916*** 
  (0.050) (0.035) (0.117)  (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) 
Union -1.004* -1.027* -1.807**  0.700 0.745 -0.275 
  (0.076) (0.070) (0.016)  (0.267) (0.237) (0.731) 
Asset Sales*Union -1.612* -1.633* -1.604*  -1.276 -1.277 -1.270 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.062)  (0.212) (0.209) (0.211) 
Leverage 1.216*** 4.758** 0.117  -0.032 7.700*** 2.265* 
  (0.000) (0.012) (0.872)  (0.928) (0.004) (0.066) 
Own 0.315** 0.228 0.209  0.331** 0.216 0.182 
  (0.025) (0.143) (0.177)  (0.042) (0.213) (0.221) 
Size -0.005 -0.006 -0.007  -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.091*** 
  (0.837) (0.803) (0.785)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Performance -0.347*** -0.348*** -0.350***  -0.448*** -0.436*** -0.443*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev*Financier  1.166    0.657  
   (0.158)    (0.114)  
Lev*Union   2.682*    4.250* 
    (0.087)    (0.058) 
Observations 3,897 3,897 3,897  3,550 3,550 3,550 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.059 0.061 0.060  0.034 0.039 0.036 
  55
   
 
Table X 
Joint Effects of Investor and Labor Protection on the 
Likelihood of Management Turnover 
 
This table reports the results of country random effects logit regressions using management Turnover as the dependent 
variable for firms located in countries above and below the median of Financier protection. Specifically:  






ik k k ik ik
ik k j ikj ik
j
Turnover F Financier Union Lev Own
Lev Financier X
    
  

     
  
 
Turnoverik is Management Turnover for firm i in country k. F(.) is the logit specification. The vector of control 
variables Xikj includes Performance and Size. Columns 1-2 estimate the model for the sub-sample of firms located in 
countries with above the median financier protection, while columns 3-4 estimate the model for the sub-sample of 
firms located in countries with below the median financier protection. All specifications are estimated with robust 
standard errors clustered by country and include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects at the two-digit level, and 
country random effects. P-values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 Financier>Median  Financier<Median 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Financier 0.072* 0.216**  0.209** 0.394* 
  (0.057) (0.035)  (0.046) (0.059) 
Union -0.696 -0.711  -0.589** -0.599** 
  (0.173) (0.163)  (0.042) (0.039) 
Leverage 0.121* 2.092  0.226* 1.856 
  (0.093) (0.279)  (0.060) (0.409) 
Own 0.183** 0.215  0.189* 0.228* 
  (0.033) (0.472)  (0.129) (0.091) 
Size 0.017 0.017  0.043** 0.044** 
  (0.496) (0.495)  (0.027) (0.026) 
Performance -0.070* -0.071*  -0.052* -0.051 
  (0.054) (0.051)  (0.0743) (0.439) 
Lev*Financier  0.651   0.775* 
   (0.304)   (0.061) 
Observations 3,607 3,607  3,646 3,646 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.028 0.029  0.041 0.042 
